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Abstract 
A negative basis trade enters a long bond position and buys protection on the issuer 
of the bond through credit default swap (CDS), aiming at arbitrage profit due to the bond-
CDS basis. To classic reduced form model theorists, the existence of the basis is an 
abnormality or merely liquidity noise. Such a view, however, fails to explain large basis 
trading losses incurred during the financial crisis. Employing a bond continuously hedged 
by CDS under a dynamic spread model with bond repo financing, we find that there is 
unhedged and unhedgeable residual jump to default risk that can’t be diversified because 
of credit correlation. An economic capital approach has to apply and a charge on the use 
of capital follows. Together with the hedge funding cost, it allows us to better understand 
the basis’s economics and to predict its fair level. 
 
Keywords: CDS-bond basis, negative basis, reduced form model, default risk, hedging 
error, FVA, KVA. 
 
1. Introduction 
A negative basis trade enters a long bond position and buys protection on the issuer 
of the bond through credit default swap (CDS), aiming at profit due on a positive carry 
when the bond’s funding cost is lower than the bond-CDS basis. Prior to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, basis trading was a popular credit arbitrage trading strategy that excited 
many hedge funds and banks’ prop trading desks. At least to some, it had turned out to be 
                                                 
1 The views and opinions expressed herein are strictly the views and opinions of the author, and do not reflect 
those of his employer and any of its subsidiaries. The author wishes to thank Joseph Langsam and Simon 
Juen for helpful comments. 
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elusive, when significant losses2 were unfolded. The basis, defined as the CDS spread 
minus same maturity bond spread, reflects a pricing discrepancy between the bond market 
and the CDS market on the same credit risk. Prior to the financial crisis, it was not a large 
number, rarely exceeding 20 bps. The financial crisis, however, saw an unprecendented 
basis widening, see Figure 1, with investment grade (IG) basis spiked at 250 bps and high 
yield (HY) at 650 bps. 
While there are certain factors such as CDS’s cheapest-to-delivery option, lack of 
voting rights conveyed to bond holders, protection seller’s credit risk, and distortion 
created by LIBOR discounting (D.E. Shaw 2009), that could contribute to the basis,  earlier 
empirical researches (e.g., Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 2005) attribute the basis mostly to 
relative liquidity between bond and CDS markets.  Such is the case, the basis is considered 
non-economic and often termed the liquidity basis. At the time, CDS was generally 
considered of better market liquidity. Following the crisis, CDS trading has been shrinking, 
due to tightened regulatory scrutiny and capital rules. Many banks exited from single name 
CDS trading (Burne and Henning, 2014). At the same time, the push for electronic trading 
and trade data collection has improved cash bond liquidity. 
In the industry, however, it has been prominently characterized as a funding basis, 
and the negative basis trade is often considered a funding arbitrage trade as credit risk is 
perfectly hedged. Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013)’s empirical study finds that funding 
liquidity, the ability to roll short term funding, plays a significant role in explaining 
historical basis, confirming the industry’s understanding and experience. 
On the modeling side, the reduced form model with issuer default probability 
calibrated to the CDS curve would predict a bond fair price quite different from the bond 
market price. The reduced form credit model (Jarrow and Turnbull, 1992 & 1995; Lando, 
1998; Duffie and Singleton, 1999) extends the interest rate term structure modeling to 
default modeling but does not consider funding and other factors when pricing a risky bond. 
In the risk neutral pricing theory, once a default time model is put in place, aggregation 
                                                 
2 According to Fontana (2010), Deutsche Bank’s prop credit trading unit reportedly lost one billion in 2007 
when some credits’ basis widened in the wrong direction, Merrill Lynch lost multiple billions in 2008 around 
the time when it was bought by bank of America, and in early 2008, Citadel’s flagship investment fund was 
down significantly due to failed basis trades. 
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and discounting of default contingent cash flows lead to a net present value (npv). A default 
intensity process is assumed and default happens as the first jump of a Cox process. The 
existence of the risk neutral measure is provided for by assuming an arbitrage-free CDS 
market, which is used to calibrate the intensity process. The other approach is, of course, 
the structural or options approach (Merton 1974), which treats debt and equity as two 
complimentary contingent claims on the same firm asset value. Because the firm asset is 
not tradeable and its value can only be inferred from the equity value, this options based 
approach3, however, does not follow the standard Merton (1976) dynamic hedging scheme. 
 
 
Figure 1. Historical IG and HY corporate CDS-bond monthly basis (bps, indices from JP 
Morgan Research) from Jan 2005 to March 2018.  
 
Recall that the classic Black-Scholes-Merton economy is complete. An option is 
attained by dynamic trading in its underlying stock. In other word, the option can be hedged 
without any error. In the credit market, such an exercise can’t be done generally without 
incurring hedging errors. Credit derivatives pricing models are therefore considered 
                                                 
3Debt and equity are hedgeable at least theoretically when the firm value is modelled as a diffusion process. 
The default time however becomes predictable. To relax that, random debt barrier is introduced or jumps are 
added to the firm value. But once we do that, the economy is incomplete again. This line of models either 
over-predict credit spreads for high yield bonds or under-predict spreads for investment grade bonds (Eom 
2005). It remains popular as a default probability model for credit risk management purposes.   
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incomplete market models. Nonetheless, pricing can procced as no-arbitrage pricing is 
perceived to be guaranteed by calibrating to CDS markets. In some sense, credit models 
can be understood to have implicitly priced in credit market incompleteness by resorting 
to the invisible hand of the CDS market. 
Note that in Merton (1976), stocks' jumps are considered idiosyncratic and not 
hedgeable. Merton resorts to the hedging portfolio’s diversification argument under the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) to derive a mixed differential-difference Black-Scholes 
type equation and an option pricing formula with lognormally distributed jumps. In the 
credit market, credits are known of correlated defaults (Duffie et al 2007). A default model 
then separates into systemic (common) factors and idiosyncratic factors.  This presents two 
issues: first, the common factor is not hedgeable, and secondly the idiosyncratic factors are 
of finite diversification, not infinite. The second issue can always be put aside as a merely 
theoretical concern, for in practice, every portfolio is finite but can always be thought of a 
good approximation of an infinite market. With regard to the first issue, typically a limited 
number of agents will warehouse the systemic risk. In doing so, a necessary compensation 
involves a charge on the economic capital incurred.  
Lou (2016) explores an economic capital approach to derivatives hedging error: the 
delta hedging strategy is designed to zero out mean hedging error while a capital reserve is 
taken as the error’s VaR measure. The fair value of the derivatives then allows a 
compensation for the cost of putting up the capital reserve. The Black-Scholes-Merton 
option pricing framework is extended and applied to the gap risk embedded in repurchase 
agreements (repo). At zero haircut, a one-year repo with 10 day MPR on main equity could 
command capital charges as large as 50 bp per annum for a 'BBB' rated borrower. Increased 
haircut reduces capital charges, e.g., to 4 bp at 10% haircut. This shows that hedging error 
or gap risk contributes to the basis between the repo rate and the risk-free rate. Naturally 
we would expect the same factor contributing to the bond-CDS basis. 
This article contributes to the literature by deriving a model of credit risky or 
defaultable bond valuation under economic capital cost and funding as well. The approach 
taken deviates from the risk neutral pricing model: we instead turn to a bond-CDS hedging 
economy, to incorporate funding cost and identify hedging error. This paper’s innovation 
is to associate the hedging error with economic capital and build a cost of capital into the 
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valuation model. The fair value is different from the risk-neutral price of the bond, resulting 
in a bond value adjustment (xva). This xva becomes the fair basis, when converted to a 
running spread per annum, which can be used as a relative value measure for the basis 
trading strategy.  
 
2. Review of Credit Default Swaps Pricing 
 
Let λ(t) be the default intensity of a Cox process defined in a probability space 
(Ω,P,₣). A bond issuer C defaults when the Cox process has its first jump at time τ. Let 
Γt=I[τ≤t] denote the default indicator, 1 if default before time t, 0 otherwise. Then the 
survival probability at time T as seen from time t denoted by qt(T) is   
𝑞𝑡(𝑇) = Pr(𝛤𝑇 = 0) = 𝐸𝑡
𝑄[𝑒− ∫ 𝜆(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑇
𝑡 ]     )1(  
where EQ is an expectation taken under the risk-neutral measure Q. Let β(t) be the 
applicable discount factor, 

t
duur
e 0
)(
=(t) with r(t) being the riskfree rate, the net present 
value (npv) of the loss process l(t) due to default, or default present value (dpv), is given 
by 
𝑑𝑝𝑣 = 𝐸𝑄 [∫ 𝛽(𝑡)𝑑𝑙(𝑡)
𝑇
0
] = 𝐸𝑄 [∫ 𝛽(𝑡)(1 − 𝑅)𝑒− ∫ 𝜆(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
] )2(   
where R is the recovery rate on notional. The present value of a unit spread on a unit 
notional, or annuity denoted by apv, is 
𝑎𝑝𝑣 = 𝐸𝑄 [∫ 𝑒− ∫ (𝑟(𝑢)+𝜆(𝑢))𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0 𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
]      (3) 
The net present value of the CDS is npv = dpv – S*apv, where S is the CDS premium4. 
 A fixed coupon risky bond is decomposed as an annuity leg, a principal leg subject 
to the issuer’s survival at maturity, and a short protection or loss leg. Credit linked notes, 
total return swaps and other credit derivatives products can be decomposed similarly. 
Assuming that the intensity is governed by a diffusion process dλt=adt+bdWt, the 
survival probability is given by the Feynman-Kac theorem,  
                                                 
4 For simplicity, the premium is assumed to pay continuously. apv formula will be broken down into a sum 
of premium periods plus premium accrual to account for default in the mid of a period, see Lando (1998). 
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In practice, the risk neutral measure is implicitly granted as a result of calibrating 
to the CDS market. 
 
2.1. CDS pricing with a PDE approach 
We set up an economy of a long CDS protection and a bank account Mt. Let Vt be 
the pre-default value of the CDS, and πt the economy’s wealth, 
,)1(` tttt VM          (5) 
Noting that the post-default value of the CDS protection is 1-R, R assumed constant 
for ease of exposition, the self-financing equation consists of earned interest on the bank 
account, premium paying out, and protection payment at default, 
tttt dRSdtdtrMdM  )1())(1(      (6) 
Differentiating (5) and plugging (6) to obtain 
ttttttt dVRSdtdtrVdVdtrd  )1())(1(    (7) 
 In the Markovian world, assuming V(t,λ) is twice differentiable and applying Ito’s 
lemma lead to 
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The last two terms, a diffusion and a compensated Poisson process, are martingales. If we 
set the dt term to zero, the fair value V is governed by 
0)1()(
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And equation (8) becomes, after multiplying the deflator βt,  
))1(()1()1()( dtdVRdW
V
bd tttttttt 

 


   (10) 
This says that the riskfree rate discounted investment portfolio βtπt is a martingale. By 
applying the Feynman-Kac formulae to equation (9), noting that at expiry T, V(T,λT)=0, 
the risk neutral pricing formula for the CDS is obtained 
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Obviously, this can be split into two parts, default present value (dpv) and unit premium or 
annuity present value (apv) as already given by equations (2 & 3). Similarly for a 
continuously paid fixed coupon bond with coupon rate rc, its PDE is given by 
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The survival probability PDE (4) can be obtained by noting that it is equivalent to zero 
payoff upon default, i.e., R=1 in a zero interest rate environment. The risky annuity can 
also be solved from (9) by setting R to 1 and S to 1. Similar to equation (11), a bond pricing 
formulae can be obtained by applying the Feynman-Kac theorem, 
]))(([)(
))()(())()((
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2.2 Hedging error 
From a dynamic portfolio perspective, πt is a hedging error, although here no 
hedging is taken place. If we start the economy with π0=0, equation (10) shows that d(βtπt) 
is a martingale, so E[βtπt]=0. The deflated wealth thus behaves like a noise or a residual 
error with zero mean, but non-zero conditional variance. Although no risk hedging takes 
place in the economy, the risky cashflow is offset on an average basis: the jump to default 
risk is evened out by accumulating premium payments and the diffusion risk is a random 
walk with zero mean.  
When the intensity is deterministic, the diffusion term drops out of equation (10), 
and the discounted wealth is a pure jump process. If we consider the bank forming an 
investment portfolio of credits, each having its own non-stochastic hazard rate and its 
default time as the first jump of a time inhomogeneous Poisson process, then these residual 
errors are independent. By the same diversification argument employed in Merton (1976), 
they will have no pricing impact. To be precise, the total error of the credit portfolio 
approaches zero with probability one by virtue of the Central Limit theorem. PDE (9) is 
justified on the basis of Ross’s Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) under perfect 
diversification. The risk neutral pricing formulae (2 & 3) still stand as they are simply the 
necessary results of the Feynman-Kac theorem applied to PDE (9). 
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If the intensity is dynamic, the residual error has both a diffusion component and a 
pure jump component, the first and second terms of equation (10) respectively. Obviously, 
if these diffusions per issuer of the investment portfolio are independent, then the same 
diversification argument alone could lay the no-arbitrage foundation for equations (9 & 
11). Credits are known to exhibit strong correlations (Duffie et al, 2007), however, so 
systemic credit risk will exist. Certain classes of the market participants are required to 
manage the undiversifiable residual variance in the form of provisional loss or capital. 
Banks and broker-dealers, for instance, are regulated and operate under stringent minimum 
capital requirements. As the variance is irreducible market-wide, and its management 
incurs costs, should the risk-neutral pricing theory be amended to price it in? 
 
3. Dynamic Hedging Risky Bond with CDS 
 
Consider a negative basis trade in which a bank’s trader B buys a bond and CDS 
protection simultaneously to earn a riskfree carry. The trader holds a unit notional of a 
coupon bond issued by C priced at Bt, and buys protection on Δt unit of notional under a 
CDS referencing party C's credit. Bt is the pre-default price, i.e., the bond price conditional 
on no-default prior to time t. Thus it is continuous. rc is the coupon rate of the bond, 
continuously paid. t is the bank’s hedging strategy, and given our setting, t ≥0, intuitively. 
The trading strategy is intended to hold to maturity, so the CDS’s expiry matches the bond 
maturity5. When dynamic trading is performed, we always buy or sell at the same CDS 
premium S. Additionally, we have these accounts in the economy.  
 Bank account: The segregated economy’s only investment option is a cash deposit 
account, with balance Mt ≥0, earning the riskfree rate r(t).  
 CDS margin account: CDS is subject to full cash variation margin (VM)6. Let Vt 
denote the fair value of the CDS per unit notional. Vt could be negative. Further 
denote LD the bilateral VM cash account (unsegregated) covering MTM of the CDS, 
                                                 
5 Standard CDS contracts pay quarterly following the IMM convention so exact maturity match would require 
bespoke CDS contract. Other practicalities include bond delivery option and recovery rate as a result of dealer 
poll. These are not considered in this hedging exercise.   
6 Whether the CDS is CCP cleared or not, a dealer bank also posts initial margin (IM). For simplicity, we 
ignore IM’s impact on CDS valuation and CCP default probability. 
   
9 
 
i.e., LD = tVt.  LD >0 when CCP posts to the bank or LD <0 when the bank posts to 
the CCP.  The collateral is in cash earning interest at rL. We assume rL=r. 
 Bond financing account: There is a securities financing market for corporate 
bonds where party B could either borrow bonds to short or borrow money to buy 
bonds. An exogenous constant haircut h applies, h ≥0. To finance the unit bond, 
cash is borrowed at the rate rp and with an amount of LB=(1-h)Bt.  
 Debt accounts: The segregated economy issues two classes of short term debts, Lh 
and N, each having a unit price or par and being rolled at short rates r1(t) and r2(t) 
respectively. Lh is devoted to the repo funding break, i.e., Lh=hB, and N is residual 
funding of the economy, Nt ≥0. 
 Economic capital (EC) reserve account: This segregated account’s sole purpose 
is to absorb potential losses should the reference obligator/issuer default and the 
segregated economy has any cash shortfall after a post-default liquidation. A 
reserve balance Nc ≥0 is required to set aside in a separate bank account, earning 
interest at r. This amount is provided by a capital financier who requires a dividend 
payment at the rate of rk. rrr kk  is the excess return on equity. 
 Other notations: 1)1( hrrhr pp  is the effective bond financing rate, 𝑙(𝑡) =
𝐵 − 𝑅 + ∆𝑡(𝑉 − (1 − 𝑅)) is the jump-to-default exposure of the basis trade, and 
𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅ = 𝑀𝑡 − 𝑁𝑡 , 𝑀𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅
+
, 𝑁𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅
−
 , combining Mt and Nt into one account. 
  
Write the economy's wealth πt as follows, 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡 + (1 − 𝛤𝑡)(𝐵 + 𝛥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐿𝐵 − 𝐿𝐷 − 𝐿ℎ − 𝑁𝑡) = 𝑀𝑡 − (1 − 𝛤𝑡)𝑁𝑡 )14(  
Accounts excluding the bank account Mt are conditional to no termination, i.e., Гt 
=0, so that all relevant quantities are to be understood as pre-default values. To shorten the 
formula, all t-subscripts have been dropped, unless necessary. Mt and Nt are non-negative 
adapted stochastic processes. All short rates are non-stochastic by themselves, either 
deterministic or functions of the intensity process λ, e.g. r1, r2, and rp. 
At t=0, the wealth reduces to 𝜋0 = 𝑀0 − 𝑁0. Let M0=0, Lh0=hB0, and N0=0 so that 
π0 = 0, i.e., the initial fund of the economy starts out at zero.  
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For τ>t≥0, during the normal course of business, the bank pursues a trading strategy 
to hedge the bond and performs all necessary funding and credit support functions 
stipulated by the CDS and repo margin agreements. Excess cash is deposited into the bank 
account; debt, if any, is serviced and rolled as needed. Interests including dividend on 
capital are collected and/or paid.  
Specifically, over a small interval of time dt, on the hedge front, buying dΔt more 
units of CDS protection at the price of Vt+dVt will cost cash of dΔt( Vt+dVt) amount. On 
the collateral side, CCP posts additional collateral amount dLD in cash while being paid of 
interest amount rLLDdt. When the bond price increases due to credit spread tightening, the 
value of the CDS contracts would decline and the economy will need to return a portion of 
the cash collateral received as CDS margin. Because the repo account is tied up to the bond 
market price through a haircut, a spread tightening causing bond price to rise will increase 
its funding by the amount of (1-h)dB, which can be used to pay down debt Lh.  
The debt accounts pay interest amount r1Lhdt and r2Ndt, roll into new issuances of 
Lh+dLh and N+dN. A negative dN signals a repayment of debt. The bank account accrues 
interest amount rMdt. The EC reserve account dividends out an amount of rkNcdt while 
receiving interest of rNcdt, a net payment of (rk-r)Ncdt. 
The wealth equation is written with all default effects implicitly built into the bank 
account Mt. If a default happens before T, i.e., τ<T, trades will have settled without delay 
and the resulting cash flow will be swiped into the bank account which is the only account 
active at that point and after. Mt may exhibit a jump at τ as a result of default settlement. 
Put everything together, the economy’s pre-default financing equation follows for t<min(T, 
τ), 
𝑑𝑀 = 𝑟𝑀𝑑𝑡 + 𝑟𝑐𝑑𝑡 + (1 − ℎ)(𝑑𝐵 − 𝑟𝑝𝐵𝑑𝑡) − ∆𝑆𝑑𝑡 + ∆(𝑑𝑉 − 𝑟𝐿𝑉𝑑𝑡) + 𝑑𝐿ℎ −
𝑟1𝐿ℎ𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝑁 − 𝑟2𝑁𝑑𝑡 − (𝑟𝑘 − 𝑟)𝑁𝑐𝑑𝑡     )15(  
In the last step, LD=ΔtV and LB= (1-h)Bt have been applied. 
Upon the issuer's default at τ, the bond recovers R fraction of its notional. CDS 
hedges settle at Δt (1-R) with the CCP (assumed non-defaultable) makes a payment of Δt 
((1-R)-V(τ)). The repo financing account also unwinds where the defaulted obligation is 
returned to the bank and the repo principal and funding interest are paid to the repo buyer 
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or lender. Adding together, the net cashflow coming to the bank account at default is R+ 
Δt (1-R-V(τ))-(1-h)B(τ)-N(τ), including paying off the debts Lh(τ) and N(τ). 
The risky bond fair value B in general will depend on (Mt, Nt) or 𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅  in addition to 
λ. Recognizing that the CDS fair value V is given by equation (9), setting the hedge ratio 
∆𝑡= −
𝜕𝐵
𝜕𝜆
/
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝜆
, applying 2-D Ito’s lemma involving both 𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅  and λ, we obtain the following 
PDE (see Appendix A for derivation), 
0)()()(
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PDE (16) is distinctive in that it is a 2-d PDE with an additional first order derivative 
term (second term) on the funding account balance 𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅ . The PDE is non-linear as it involves 
products of the forms:
M
B
B


 and 
M
BB





. Its highest order derivative term however 
remains simple. 𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅  is given by 
dttlMrMd ))((  , or  

 
t
ut duuluMM tt
0
1
0
1 )()(       (17) 
with 𝑀0̅̅ ̅̅ = 0 . Its differential form shows that it accumulates on the cash rate and 
compensates the instantaneous expected loss of the trade. The integral form is path 
dependent, resembling the accumulated average price in an Asian option. 
 
Special case:  If the intensity is deterministic, we can set 𝛥𝑡 =
𝐵−𝑅
1−𝑅−𝑉
 to zero out the jump 
to default (JtD) loss l(t). It is indeed hedgeable, so long as the intensity is not dynamic. 
Equations (16 & 17) reduce to  
0)()()(
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CDS PDE (9) becomes  
0)1()(  RSVr
dt
dV
        (19) 
Adding (18) and (19), noting that 00 M , so 0tM , leads to 
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where rrr kk  . B+V in fact is the typical negative basis trade with the loss function 
v=B+V-1.  
v is not guaranteed to be zero in general. To enforce zero loss, v=0, bond price 
would have to be B=1-V. In this case, 0tM , Nc is zero because of no need for capital. 
Now if rc=r (zero spread floating rate bond) and S=0, equation (20) shows
0)(  vr
dt
dv
 , which trivially proves that B=1-V for all t, i.e., a zero-spread bond and 
zero premium CDS will always price to par in an ideal riskfree financing condition.  
 
A fair basis formula: Obviously, if rrp  , then B+V can be solved as one variable. In 
fact, it can be written in terms of v,  
0)(  ckc NrrSrvr
dt
dv
       (21) 
This shows that, if the bond can be financed at the riskfree rate, the negative basis 
trade earns a carry of rc-S-r and pays out a dividend on capital. The solution to (21), 
assuming constant rc-S-r- kr Nc, is  
)(* ckc NrrSrapvv         (22) 
This is exactly the empirical formula some traders use to estimate their basis trade 
profit and loss or to evaluate whether a basis trade is economically appealing, except with 
the bond repo cost pr replacing r, i.e., 𝜈 = 𝑎𝑝𝑣 ∗ (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑆 − 𝑟?̅? − 𝑟?̅?𝑁𝑐). 
Now setting v to zero leads to a fair bond-CDS basis formula: 
 (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑆 − 𝑧)𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 = (𝑟?̅? − 𝑧) + 𝑟?̅?𝑁𝑐.      (23) 
where z is a short rate for Libor. So the break-even or fair bond-CDS basis consists of the 
effective funding cost and cost of economic capital. The fair basis is always negative, 
unless the overall bond financing rate is lower than Libor7. 
                                                 
7 In the industry, the basis is CDS spread minus Z-spread, which is measured on top of the Libor swap curve. 
Both term repo funding rate and unsecured rate are quoted on top of Libor. Positive basis could also be made 
possible when relative liquidity favors CDS.  
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4. Economic Capital 
 
We have one more quantity undetermined in (16), namely Nc, the capital account 
balance. Following Lou (2016), we can define a discounted hedging error (wealth) VaR 
measure as the economic capital.  With the bond priced as such, the hedging error is left 
with jump risk only,  
))1()(( dtdtldtrd tt         (24) 
Deflating (24) and integrating to T yield  




 
T
t
sttTT TIldssl )()()(     (25) 
This shows that the discounted wealth of the economy accumulates continuously 
over time till the earlier of maturity or default, at the rate of default intensity times the jump 
to default loss. Now we can define the loss of economic value at time t for the full 
remaining duration of the economy and its VaR as follows, 
T
t
T
tt 


 ˆ  
}1)ˆPr(:inf{ qxRxVaR tt   .     (26) 
Because E[ tˆ ] is zero, Nc(t)=VaRt. When a loss is realized and the wealth is not 
sufficient to pay the loss, money in the reserve account will be drawn to cover loss. On an 
expectation basis, the wealth growth is sufficient to meet the loss, so economic capital is 
for unexpected losses.  
As is defined, the gain/loss function l(t) is coupled with the bond price through PDE 
(16). While a numerical solution can always be tried, there is something else we need to 
consider: the portfolio diversification effect. The loss function is defined on the issuer’s 
default, in total disregard of other trading positions the bank might have. In a typical credit 
risk management approach, default correlation is recognized. A classic treatment is 
Vasicek’s large loan portfolio theory where the default correlation is assumed to be 
constant and a limit is taken such that each constituent of the portfolio can compute its 
contribution to the economic capital on a standalone basis. This in fact is the foundation of 
BASEL II and III’s wholesale credit risk capital approach (Gordy 2003). 
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For a unit notional exposure, BASEL III provides the following formulae to 
compute the regulatory capital requirement,  
b
bM
PD
NPDN
NLGDK
5.11
)5.2(1
])
1
)999.0()(
([
11









  (27) 
where K is the capital requirement, PD is one year probability of default, LGD is downturn 
loss given default, M is the effective maturity. Additionally, ρ is correlation and b is a 
maturity adjustment factor, given as follows,  
2))ln(05478.011852.0(
)],
)50exp(1
)50exp(1
1(24.0)
)50exp(1
)50exp(1
12.0[
PDb
PDPD
AVC







 (28) 
where AVC=1.25 is an asset value correlation multiplier for large regulated financial 
institutions or unregulated financial institutions, 1 for other firms. The formulae and its 
parameters are further explained in BCBS 2005. 
If we adopt the above as the economic capital measurement, alignment of economic 
capital and regulatory capital is achieved. This is advantageous in light of recent 
discussions of capital valuation adjustment (KVA) which seems to have become the next 
controversial value adjustment following FVA.  KVA as advocated by some is bank 
specific and regulatory region dependent (Sherif, 2016).  Indiscretionary application of 
such a KVA is certainly debatable. Consider a simple example of a trading book containing 
a long European option on a stock. If the trader chooses to keep it unhedged, then a market 
risk VaR exists. But if the trader dynamically hedges the option within the trading book, 
the book will have zero VaR. A trader charging KVA in the former case by lowering his 
bid will only cut himself off from the market and no trade will be coming to his way. 
This simple example shows that for a complete market like the equity market, no 
KVA should be made to the fair value and charged to customers. For incomplete markets 
such as the credit market, the risk capital due to the systemic risk factor can’t be reduced 
and its cost should be an integral part of pricing. Ideally, a capital charge should be based 
on economic capital, economically truthful to the market and its products as is. In Lou 
(2016), the gap risk of a secured financing transaction is analyzed and economic capital is 
found to be higher than regulatory capital with near zero haircuts and lower in high haircut 
region. KVA is then introduced as a cost of economic capital and found to play an 
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important role in repo pricing. This type of KVA is different from regulatory capital based 
KVA, which has been proposed by some as an alternative to a RWA hurdle rate based 
pricing to help banks allocate regulatory capital costs. 
Suppose we adopt equations (27 and 28) as the economic capital per unit of 
exposure, we then need to determine the exposure amount for the basis trade, which is 
given by equation (25). Although precise, this is obviously not an ideal form, because it’s 
convoluted with the fair value of the bond and CDS. Numerical solutions can proceed, but 
some simpler alternatives are desired in practice. First we can adopt a fixed exposure. 
Second, we could establish the loss function from the risk neutral pricing of the bond and 
CDS fair values respectively. Third, an add-on approach can be adopted based on the 
hedged portfolio’s CS01 and duration. Because it is a capital measure, we could always 
start with a more conservative approach by employing a sufficiently large fixed exposure.  
 
5. Numerical Examples 
 
PDE (16) shows that a bond’s fair value not only depends on the default intensity 
but also relates to its accumulated default risk compensation M . Once the bond’s fair value 
B is computed, it can be compared with the risk neutral bond price B* to determine a total 
valuation adjustment (xva), xva = B*
 
- B. Since the CDS is priced under the OIS 
discounting, B* is consistent with CDS price8. xva, when converted into a running spread 
by dividing with the risky annuity, becomes the fair basis, a measurement of fair carrying 
cost of a basis trade.  It can be used as a relative value measure in comparison to current 
market implied bond-CDS basis.  
 
                                                 
8 For a floating rate bond, its pricing can be obtained by considering a bond plus CDS package where the 
CDS references the bond and has the same spread Sb as the bond’s spread over the floating index. Prior to 
default or the bond maturity whichever comes first, the package has a net interest cash flow of the index. 
Upon a default or maturity, it pays the par amount. So the package’s cash flow resembles that of a randomly 
terminating, loss free floating rate par bond that always price at the par, regardless of its termination date. 
Therefore the bond price npvbond = 1 – npvcds = 1 – (dpv-Sb*apv) = 1 – dpv + Sb *apv. 
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 Figure 2. Sample distribution of jump-to-default loss of a basis trading strategy longing a 
coupon bond and a zero premium CDS protection. r=0, R=0. 
  
To get some sense of the magnitude of the jump-to-loss exposure a basis trading 
strategy could create, we consider a 5% fixed coupon bond protected by a zero premium 
CDS, each priced in the usual risk neutral way. The exposure is maximized at initial time, 
i.e., t=0. Figure 2 also plots ‘JtD Loss’ for a 2% coupon bond. Obviously the exposure 
reduces significantly. The exposure is greatest at small λ, as lower λ leads to higher bond 
price thus exposure at default. 
A finite difference scheme is developed to solve equation (16) for the risky bond 
price B and equation (12) for B*. Implied basis between the bond and CDS can then be 
deduced. Table 1 shows a simple test case where a 10 year zero coupon bond and zero 
premium CDS are priced with the Crank-Nicholson finite difference (FD) scheme solving 
PDE (9&12). This test satisfies the par test, i.e., bond + CDS npv is par. Also delta and 
gamma are seen to be offsetting. The last row also gives the bond’s price computed from 
80000 paths of Monte Carlo simulation, as an accuracy check for the FD scheme.  
Table 1. FD test case of bond and CDS parity vs Monte Carlo. 
  Prc/NPV Delta Gamma 
Bond 40.25913 -1.09976 16.36011 
CDS 59.74087 1.09976 -16.36011 
MC 40.23167 - - 
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Consider a fixed rate coupon bond at a credit spread of 1.2%, 10 year maturity, 
investment grade (IG) rated. Figure 3 shows total valuation adjustment (xva) converted 
into basis points (bp), i.e., the fair basis, under three economic capital requirements.  
 
  
Figure 3. IG bond xva (fair basis) vs cummulative funding amount 𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅ , with above 
variables in Table below, second row (IG). 
variables T h rp-r rc-r rb-r r 
IG 10 10% 0.15% 1.20% 1.40% 2% 
HY 5 20% 0.20% 5% 1% 2% 
 
The first is a fixed 1.6% of the notional; the second is 5% fixed exposure, and the 
last is variable exposure by l(t). In the second and last cases, the capital requirement ratio 
is computed per equation (27) where the PD is calculated locally as one year default 
probability. When the funding amount 𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅  turns positive (meaning deposit at the bank), xva 
drops as the part of funding cost corresponding to the negative 𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅  (for borrowing at much 
higher rate) disappears. 
A common choice for the debt account rate r1 is the dealer bank’s senior unsecured 
rate rb. For r2, we mix in between rk and rb, 𝑟2 = 𝜀𝑟𝑘 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑟𝑏, where ε is the inverse of 
the leverage ratio, e.g., 5% given 20 time leverage. Figure 4 shows a 5 year high yield (HY) 
0
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bond’s total xva under the variable exposure. As rb increases, the funding component of 
xva increases while the capital component (KVA) remains relatively flat. 
 
 
Figure 4. HY 5y 5% spread bond’s xva (fair basis) vs bank’s unsecured rate rb.  Variables 
in the last row of Table in Figure 3. 
  
The levels of xva shown in Figure 3 & 4 are in the range of 60 to 120 bps, 
reasonably mild in the context of the historical basis graph (Figure 1.)  Figure 4 in particular 
reflects the funding cost well through the approximate basis formula. The spike during the 
crisis relates to funding and market volatility. Table 2 lists the average basis for the two 
halves of 2007 and the whole 2008, together with overnight repo spreads to the Fed funds 
rate with ‘BBB’ and ‘A’ rated US corporate bond collateral. Clearly, widening of the basis 
accompanied increased repo spread and market volatility index VIX, as the crisis 
progressed, and large negative basis trading losses were reported. 
 
Table 2. Average IG and HY basis for 1st and 2nd half of 2017 and year 2008, with bond 
funding costs and VIX (from Gorton and Metric, 2012). 
  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
0 1 2 3 4 5
xv
a 
(%
)
unsecured rate (%) rb- r
XVA
repo spread (bp) VIX(%) IG Basis HY Basis
1st Half 2007 2.01 13.05 -1.32 15.3
2nd Half 2007 61.85 21.88 -19.65 -4.2
2008 136.19 33.68 -103.26 -210.2
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Using three month Libor-OIS spread (LOIS) as a control variable for funding cost 
and VIX for capital, regression of the daily time series from Jan 2005 to March 2018 (Table 
3) shows that both LOIS and VIX are significant. They explain about 65% of variation, for 
both the IG and HY historical basis. Noting that VIX is an equity market volatility, not 
exactly a measure of credit risk capital and that market liquidity variable has not been 
included, this leaves room for future research. 
  
Table 3. Basis regression results (coefficient column followed by standard error column) 
vs Libor-OIS spread and VIX. IG R2 0.648, HY R2 0.662. 
  IG IG-error HY HY-error 
Intercept 0.34564 0.012644 1.0125 0.027542 
LOIS -46.341 2.5188 -45.642 4.7025 
VIX -2.6624 0.082811 -7.9847 0.18038 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The basis is interesting or rather naughty in that it is a theoretical arbitrage 
opportunity, yet arbitragers often incur large losses. We propose a risky bond valuation 
model that understands its behavior from a funding and capital perspective. Funding cost 
comes from bond financing which is not riskfree. As the credit spread is dynamic, the basis 
trade can only hedge its diffusion risk and has to leave its residual jump to default risk 
unhedged. Because corporate default is known to be correlated, this residual default risk is 
not diversifiable. An economic capital reserve has to be taken and that incurs capital cost.  
These cost factors, not considered in the traditional reduced form risk neutral 
pricing model, lower a defaultable bond’s valuation, thus contributing to the negative basis. 
By setting up a risky bond dynamically hedged by CCP cleared CDS, we derive a two 
dimensional, quasi-linear PDE for the basis trade. Vasicek’s large loan portfolio theory is 
used to estimate economic capital, in line with BASEL’s wholesale credit risk capital 
requirement. The fair value solved from the PDE via finite difference method is converted 
into a fair basis to facilitate assessment of basis trade economics.  
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Our approach to cost of capital differs from KVA, a firm specific and regime 
sensitive regulatory capital value adjustment advocated by some researchers. We in fact 
imply a different form of KVA by associating it with unhedged systemic default risk and 
its resultant economic capital.  
Numerical computation shows that reasonable repo financing cost and capital 
charge can adequately predict the negative basis. Limited basis data regression analysis 
confirms the role of these factors, although further empirical research will be desired to 
fully explain the basis. 
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Appendix A. Risky Bond Valuation PDE Derivation 
 
Differentiate equation (14) and plug in dMt from (15), 
𝑑𝜋 − 𝑟𝜋𝑑𝑡 = (1 − 𝛤𝑡)(𝑟𝑐𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝐵 − ((1 − ℎ)𝑟𝑝 + ℎ𝑟1)𝐵𝑑𝑡 + ∆(𝑑𝑉 − 𝑟𝐿𝑉𝑑𝑡 −
𝑆𝑑𝑡) − (𝑟2 − 𝑟)𝑁𝑑𝑡 − (𝑟𝑘 − 𝑟)𝑁𝑐𝑑𝑡) − 𝑙(𝑡)𝑑𝛤𝑡    (A.1) 
with ))1(()( RVRBtl  . Complementing dΓt with its compensator, (A.1) becomes, 
 𝑑𝜋 − 𝑟𝜋𝑑𝑡 = (1 − 𝛤𝑡)[𝑑𝐵 − 𝑟?̅?𝐵𝑑𝑡 + 𝑟𝑐𝑑𝑡 + 𝜆𝑑𝑡(𝑅 − 𝐵) − (𝑟2 − 𝑟)𝑁𝑑𝑡 −
(𝑟𝑘 − 𝑟)𝑁𝑐𝑑𝑡 + ∆(𝑑𝑉 − 𝑟𝐿𝑉𝑑𝑡 − 𝑆𝑑𝑡 + 𝜆𝑑𝑡(1 − 𝑅 − 𝑉))] − 𝑙(𝑡)(𝑑𝛤𝑡 −
(1 − 𝛤𝑡)𝜆𝑑𝑡)           (A.2) 
Pre-default, rewrite (15) as follows, 
 𝑑(𝑀 − 𝑁) − 𝑟(𝑀 − 𝑁)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑟𝑐𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝐵 − 𝑟?̅?𝐵𝑑𝑡 + ∆(𝑑𝑉 − 𝑟𝐿𝑉𝑑𝑡 − 𝑆𝑑𝑡) −
(𝑟2 − 𝑟)𝑁𝑑𝑡 − (𝑟𝑘 − 𝑟)𝑁𝑐𝑑𝑡       (A.3) 
Combining M and N into one account 𝑀𝑡̅̅̅̅ , with 00 M , equation (A.3) becomes 
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  (A.4) 
In general, Bt could be a function of λt and tM , so that a 2-dimensional Ito’s lemma 
applies, 
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We are looking for a solution where tMd  has dt term but no diffusion term, so that 
the last two variations are zero. In such a case, the financing equation (21) becomes, 
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Now back to the wealth equation (A.2), apply 2-D Ito’s lemma to dBt and V’s PDE 
(9), set the hedge ratio ∆𝑡= −
𝜕𝐵
𝜕𝜆
/
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝜆
, and rewrite equation (A.2) as follows 
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  (A.6) 
To make the discounted wealth tt a martingale, setting dt term to zero leads to 
ckcp NrrMrrBRrBr
dt
Md
M
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t
)()()()( 2 

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

  =0  (A.7) 
Equation (A.6) reduces to (24). Given this, once again, the financing equation (A.5) 
reduces to, 
dttlMrMd ))((          (A.8) 
Indeed, Md  has only dt term, no diffusion term, and )(tlMrdtMd  . (A.7) now 
becomes equation (16). 
